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Abstract In this paper we analyze the influence that incentives play in the timing of
the transition to retirement in Spain. We use the Continuous Sample of Working His-
tories 2006 (CSWH “Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales”, in Spanish) to construct
incentive measures from the Social Security provisions in relation to retiring at old
age. We analyse the role played by such incentives and other socio-economic variables
on the retirement hazard of men aged between 60 and 70, using a duration model to
carry out a dynamic analysis. We assess the effects of the pension system reform that
took place in 2002, which set stricter conditions to access an old pension. The results
show that both the pension wealth and the substitution effects play a significant role in
retirement decisions, but that, after the reform, the latter effects become less important.
Keywords Older workers employment · Retirement · Public pensions
JEL Classification J14 · J26
1 Introduction
There has been a decline in the labour force participation of older workers, over the last
decades. While in the seventies, the participation rates of males over 55 exceeded 50 %,
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in 2008 it did not reach 30 %. The role of pension benefits rules in this evolution may
have been crucial. These rules may be too generous in providing income support, and
they may also create incentives to early retirement. Three characteristics are relevant
in this context: the amount of the pension that the system provides, the pattern of
benefits associated with each age of retirement, and the entitlement rights that define
the conditions to be met to be able to claim a pension at each age.
While many countries have already implemented large reforms,1 Spain has mainly
undertaken parametric changes in its Social Security system, which have been agreed
under the so-called Toledo Agreement. They have been directed to reducing incentives
to early retirement and to increasing incentives to leave the labour market at a later age.
Active labour force policies that should stimulate the demand for elderly workers have
also been proposed with the aim of contributing to raising labour market participation
of the elderly. At the end of the day, the effects of pensions on retirement compound
labour supply and demand forces, so that their final impact is an empirical issue.
The goal of this paper is to quantify the role that Social Security provisions for old-
age pensions play in the retirement decision of Spanish workers and to evaluate the
effects of the 2002 reform. We propose to estimate a model for retirement that captures
the effects of pension incentives on the timing of the pension claim. In particular, we
analyse the probability of claiming a pension at a specific age, given that the worker
has not yet retired, as a function, not only of individual demographic characteristics,
but also of the economic incentives underlying the retirement legislation.
There is already a large body of research that examines the economic incentives
created by the pension system in Spain (see, e.g., Boldrin et al. 1999, 2004; Boldrin
and Jimenez-Martín 2007; Jimenez-Martín 2006; Moral-Arce et al. 2009). Our contri-
bution to this field is twofold. First, we exploit the longitudinal information contained
in the Continuous Sample of Working Histories (CSWH, “Muestra Continua de Vidas
Laborales”, MCVL in Spanish), wave 2006, with a duration model.2 The detailed
information contained in the CSWH, from Spanish Social Security administrative
records and that is accompanied by Census data, allows tracking workers’ decisions
over time so as to take time dependence into account. Moreover, the CSWH has the
advantage over other databases used in previous empirical work3 that its sample design
is publicly known and, therefore, it allows for a better and broader interpretation of
the results.
Instead of proposing a point in time estimation, we analyse retirement patterns and
the effects of economic incentives using a logistic specification of a duration model.
This approach allows the analysis of the role played at each age by incentives stemming
from social security rules.
1 See Whitehouse et al. (2009) for a recent review of pension reforms in industrialized countries.
2 Moral-Arce et al. (2009) also use the CSWH to evaluate the economic incentives generated by the Social
Security System in Spain, but, unlike our work, they carry out such an analysis restricted to a given point
in time, 2007.
3 A previous sample of a similar database with information up to 1995 and whose description can be
found in Martínez (1999), has been used in Boldrin et al. (1999, 2004), Boldrin and Jimenez-Martín (2007),
Jimenez-Martín and Sánchez (2006), and Jimenez-Martín et al. (2006). The main drawbacks of such sample
are that the detailed sample design has not been disclosed and that it is not publicly available.
123
SERIEs (2013) 4:273–307 275
The second contribution of this paper is the quantification of the effect on retirement
decisions of the reform that was agreed in 2001 in Spain (Acuerdo para la Mejora
y el Desarrollo del Sistema de Protección Social, April 2001) and that was fully
implemented in 2002 (Law 35/2002, July). In particular, in this paper, we consider the
effects of three main changes (a more detailed description of the reform is provided
in Annex 1).4 On the one hand, the reform gave access to early retirement before
the statutory retirement age established at 65, for all workers that were at least 61,
had at least 30 years of contributory life (2 of which within the last 15) and their last
employment termination had been involuntary. Up to then, only those who had worked
before 1967 were entitled to take early retirement from the age of 60. On the other
hand, the reform increased the linkages between the contributive effort exerted by
workers and the pension received, setting the penalty for early retirement decreasing
with age and total years of contribution. Moreover, each full year of employment
beyond statutory retirement age (65), implied a 2 % increase in the regulatory base to
compute retirement benefits, so that those workers older than 65, with at least 35 years
of contributions could receive a pension that exceeded 100 % of the regulatory base
value.
We selected a sample of men aged from 60 to 70 in 2006, that had contributed
to the Social Security General Scheme and that were entitled to receive retirement
benefits. The sample period spans 10 years, from 1996 to 2006. We analyse retirement
decisions that imply a full withdrawal from the labour market and that give rise to an
old-age pension.5 We assimilate the claiming of the pension to the decision to retire
for good, whether or not the worker was already discouraged and had stopped looking
for a job well before claiming the pension.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a literature survey of
the role played by Social Security in the retirement decision of elderly workers, placing
special emphasis on the works addressing the Spanish pension system. Section 3
contains the empirical strategy while Sect. 4 describes the dataset used in the empirical
analysis. Section 5 summarises the main results and Sect. 6 contains the conclusions.
Additionally, two appendixes are included in the paper. Appendix A provides a short
explanation about the main features of the Spanish Social Security pension system.
Appendix B contains a brief description of the variables used in the empirical analysis
and the detailed results of the estimation.
2 Previous empirical work on the role of Social Security on retirement decisions
in Spain
As mentioned in the previous section, labour force participation rates among older
workers and retirement patterns have been extensively analyzed in the literature
for Spain; cf. Alba (2007), Boldrin et al. (1999, 2004), Ahn and Mira (2000),
4 Another change introduced in 2002 was the regulation of partial retirement which allowed employment
and old-age pensions to be simultaneously enjoyed [see Cairó-Blanco (2010) for an analysis of its impact].
5 See Argimón et al. (2007a) for an analysis of different labour status in old age; Argimón et al. (2007a)
for the impact of individual demographic characteristics on the likelihood of retirement at each age without
considering economic incentives.
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Conde-Ruiz and Galasso (2003), Gutiérrez-Domènech (2006). These research doc-
uments changes in retirement patterns during the last decades that reflect a trend
towards early retirement and lower participation rates among older workers.
An important line of research in Spain is the one devoted to the analysis of the
sustainability of the retirement pension system and the reforms needed to reinforce it;
cf. Barea (1996), Herce and Alonso-Messeguer (1999), Jimeno and Licandro (1999),
Jimeno (2001), Herce et al. (2005), (2009), Messeguer (2006), Balmaseda et al. (2006),
Díaz-Gimenez and Díaz-Saavedra (2009a),. The analysis is usually formulated in
terms of overlapping generation models. Overall, the available evidence on the effects
of delaying the normal retirement age a number of given years shows that it has a
favourable impact on the sustainability of the Spanish pension system; cf. Montero-
Muñoz (2000), Sánchez-Martín (2003), Boldrin and Jimenez-Martín (2007), Díaz-
Gimenez and Díaz-Saavedra (2009b), Sánchez-Martín and Sánchez-Marcos (2008),
Conde-Ruiz and González (2012).
Regarding the specific aim of this paper, there is quite a lot of research providing
empirical evidence for Spain for the relationship between the incentives embedded
in the social security rules and retirement decisions; e.g. Martín and Moreno (1990),
Lopez-Garcia (1990), Gómez and Hernandez de Cos (2004). These studies focus on
financial determinants to retire (the different rights acquired through age, gender,
contributed earnings, years of contribution, pension replacement rates, etc) and the
implicit incentives created by the system. The available micro-econometric evidence
for Spain shows that the early retirement provisions play an important role in the modal
age of retirement and its pattern in different ages (see, e.g., Boldrin et al. 1999,2004)
and that, in general, labour force transitions of elderly men depend on Social Security
regulations—see Alba (2007), García-Pérez and Sánchez-Martín (2008a,b)6, and are
correlated with health considerations—see Blanco (2000); Prieto Rodríguez (2002);
and Jimenez-Martín et al. (2006).
Boldrin et al. (1999, 2004) and Jimenez-Martín (2006) conclude that, while eco-
nomic and financial measures of retirement incentives play some role in explaining
retirement behavior, a substantial portion of the latter still remains unexplained and
cannot be explained by Social Security factors. Further research by García-Pérez and
Sánchez-Martín (2008b) find evidence of the relevance of social security incentives
in explaining transitions from unemployment for older workers. Likewise, using a
sample of individuals aged between 56 and 70 from the European Union Household
Panel (PHOGUE), wave 7 (2000), Utrilla De La Hoz and Ubago (2005) find that a
replacement rate (pension over total income) below 80 % reduces the probability of
retiring.
As for the impact of minimum pensions, this time based on the estimation of the
behavioural parameters of a structural model, Jimenez-Martín and Sánchez (2006,
2007) show that the existence of minimum pension regulation has an impact on early
retirement decisions. They find that the combination of age penalties and minimum
pensions generate large incentives to early retirement for those workers with low
wages and short labour histories. They conclude that there is a threefold increase in
6 García-Pérez and Sánchez-Martín (2008a,b) provide some results on the links between unemployment,
retirement and their associated public insurance programmes calibrated with data from the CSWH.
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retirement at 60 with respect to the economy without minimum pensions and total
early retirement (before or at 60) is almost 50 % larger.
The effect of the successive pension reforms that have taken place in Spain has
been empirically addressed in a series of papers. The results point out, in general, to
their effectiveness in lowering retirement rates. Jimenez-Martín (2006) carries out a
simulation exercise that computes the effect of the Spanish old age pension reforms
that took place in 1997 and 2002 and concludes that they reduce the hazard rates.
A similar qualitative result is found in Gutiérrez-Domènech (2006), where, using a
longitudinal survey of catalan population, it is shown that the 2002 reform contributed
to the increase in the probabilities of workers older than 60 to stay employed. On
the other hand, Sánchez-Martín (2010), using a calibrated overlapping-generations
model, within a general equilibrium framework, finds that the overall effect of the
2002 reform is a clear drop in the average retirement age, as younger cohorts of low
income workers benefit from the opportunity of leaving the labour force early. Cairó-
Blanco (2010) analyses partial retirement incentives introduced in 2002 and its impact
on the average age of retirement using the option-value framework.
3 Empirical framework
This paper follows the hazard-model approach used by many authors, such as Samwick
(1998), Gruber and Wise (1999, 2004), and Blundell et al. (2002), which postulate
that both Social Security wealth and its evolution in the future are determinants of
retirement decisions Gustman and Steinmeier (2008). Although a structural model
(Burtless 1986), or applied general equilibrium models (Imrohoroglu et al. 1999)
could provide more insight into the decision process, we choose the simplicity of the
reduced form technique because of the computational complexity of the alternative
approaches.7
In particular, the retirement decision is analysed in this paper following a duration
model approach, that treats such decision as a dynamic discrete choice, and allows
taking into account time dependence. The duration variable (T) for an individual
i is defined as the period that spans from the age the person becomes entitled to
receive a retirement pension (ei ) until the age that she claims the benefit (bi ), ti =
(bi + 1) − ei =. That is, if the person i retires the year she becomes entitled to claim
a pension, (ei = bi ), we say that her period of survival is 1. T is treated as a discrete
time-varying variable, defined in years, so that ti I [1,6]. Accordingly, we define the
survival function S at duration ti as the probability that the survival time for individual
i be at least ti
S(ti ) = Si = prob(T ≥ ti ) =
ti∏
ti =1
(1 − f (ti ) (1)
with f (ti ) = Pr{T = ti }
7 See Jimenez-Martín et al. (2006) for a survey of the features of different approaches used in the literature
to study the effects of population aging on Social Security expenditures.
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Table 1 Distribution by year of birth and retirement age
Born 60 61 62 63 64 65 Not retired Total
1936 205 199 152 295 892 189 1,932
1937 880 201 162 149 295 866 195 2,748
1938 817 136 159 153 285 819 170 2,539
1939 652 103 135 134 243 732 190 2,189
1940 948 168 225 232 401 1,225 314 3,513
1941 704 140 187 192 332 981 893 3,429
1942 607 186 170 188 350 1,956 3,457
1943 600 213 231 205 2,671 3,920
1944 554 200 220 2,963 3,937
1945 546 209 3,449 4,204
1946 388 3,597 3,985
Total 6,696 1,761 1,688 1,405 2,201 5,515 16,587 35,853
Pro Memoria
Observed hazard rates 20.0 % 7.0 % 8.4 % 9.0 % 19.0 % 73.9 %
Sample of men born between 1936 and 1946 having worked in the General Scheme and with a relation with
the Social Security in 2006
Data is right censored as the dataset contains some workers that either can only be
observed before they take the decision of interest (i.e. claim pension benefit), because
we only observe the individuals up to the year 2006, or did not claim a retirement
pension before the age of 66. It is also the case that for some cohorts we can only have
observations of people retiring after a given age (60 for those born in 1936) or before
a given age (for instance, at most at 60 for those born in 1946) given that this is the
age when the sample was extracted, as shown in Table 1.
The hazard function (i.e. the probability of an individual retiring precisely at dura-
tion ti , given that he has not retired before), is defined as:
φ (ti |Xi) = prob{T = ti |T ≥ ti, Xi} = prob(T = ti |Xi)/prob(T ≥ ti | Xi)
where Xi is a vector of explanatory variables, some of which are time dependent, and
others are constant and independent of time.
Xi =
(
x1i, x2i, . . . , xmi(t), . . . , xni(t)
)
That is, some of the variables in X, such as the ones related with working status
or the measures of incentive mechanisms that are standard in this literature, are time-
varying covariates while others, contain information about time-invariant individual
characteristics.
Notice that in discrete time, the survival function can be written in terms of the
hazards at prior periods,
Sk = (1 − φ1) ∗ (1 − φ2) ∗ · · · ∗ (1 − φk−1) =
k−1∏
t1=1
(1 − φt1) (2)
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Let’s say that n is the number of individuals we observed retiring at t = k, and r−n
the number of individuals that continue working at t = k (censored data in retirement).

















The database Continuous Sample of Working Histories (CSWH 2006) contains the
working and contributory-pension history of more than one million individuals, whose
anonymity is preserved. It is a 4 % random sample from a reference population, which
is composed of all the people who at any time during 2006 had a registered record
with the Social Security system, either because they were contributing or because they
were receiving a pension. While unemployed workers are included, as the National
Employment Service pays their social contributions to the Social Security Funds, civil
servants (public sector employment) are not,8 as there is no information on the Clases
Pasivas scheme.
The data contain, for each employment spell, information on covered earnings,
which are the amount of the earnings that the Social Security takes into account for
the computation of pension rights. Covered earnings can be regarded as a good proxy
for actual earnings, although they are subject to a ceiling and a floor: on the one
hand, a minimum contribution must be paid over earnings, independently of the actual
amount received; on the other hand, earnings above a given ceiling are not subject to
contribution and therefore do not generate further rights.
Moreover, for each employment spell, CSWH 2006 also provides information asso-
ciated with the job, such as the length and type of contract, worker’s Social Security
Scheme, the so-called contribution group, as well as limited information about the
firm, such as its activity sector and location (province). Available data also include
some personal characteristics such as sex, age, place and year of birth. As far as social
transfers are concerned, the database contains information about periods and amounts
enjoyed for old-age and disability pensions, and survivors’ pensions such as, orphan-
age, widowhood and family help. There is no data on other sources of individual wealth
or other sources of income. The CSWH has been matched with information coming
from the Census. In the Census’ module “Co-inhabitants” there is information about
the number of people living with the person in the CSWH dataset, their age and sex,
but not their working status.
8 A detailed description of the sample can be found in Seguridad Social (2006) and an overview in Argimón
and González (2006).
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4.2 The subsample
The analysis is performed over a subsample that covers all male workers who had
contributed to Social Security at least once in their lifetime, had not collected an old age
pension before 1997, and were born between 1936 and 1946, so that in 2006 they were
between 60 and 70 years old. Moreover, we restricted the sample to those men whose
longest contributory relationship with the Social Security took place in the Social
Security General Scheme,9 which accounts for about 72 % of total social contributions,
and who had not claimed disability benefits. We also dropped a limited number of
individuals whose available labour and pension history did not seem to be consistent.
Several reasons justify restricting the analysis to the specified subsample. First, the
sample only refers to men because women often have quite different labour patterns
that can be rather gender specific. In particular, women often experience a greater
number of career interruptions than men during their potential working life—due, for
instance, to maternity leaves—so that different gender-linked behaviour in labour par-
ticipation could be expected. Furthermore, women may react differently to economic
incentives. In particular, the literature that examines retirement’s decisions within
households shows that women respond significantly to the employment situation of
their husbands, choosing to retire at the same time as their partners Gustman and Stein-
meier (2004). Data about socio-demographic characteristics, such as marital status are
poorly recorded in the CSWH. The available information on age and gender of people
living in the same household, which could be used to proxy civil status, corresponds
to the data provided when the administrative records were registered for the first time
and moreover, there is no reference whatsoever to the spouse’s working status, labour
history or Social Security contributions. Hence, it is not possible to consider the joint
decision to retire using these data.
Second, given that our aim is to analyze retirement decisions taken by the elderly,
we restrict the initial sample to people that were aged from 60 to 70 in 2006 (i.e. those
born between 1936 and 1946) and that had already become entitled to a pension ben-
efit, defined in terms of being able to prove at least 15 contributory years. Third, the
exclusion of those that received an old-age pension coming from disability is justified
as the determinants to claim such kind of pension are most likely linked to health,
which is not comparable with the rest of the determinants. Moreover, in this case, the
transition to the old-age retirement scheme is deterministic, as disability pensions are
transformed into retirement pensions once the beneficiaries turn 65 years old. Finally,
to ensure homogeneity in pension rules, the sample is limited to those whose longest
recorded labour relation had taken place in the Social Security General Scheme, which
is the one that gathers the largest proportion of workers. The sub-sample we use for
the analysis comprises 35,853 men, whose distribution by year of birth and retirement
age is reflected in Table 1.
The last row in Table 1 reflects the observed hazard rates at each age. We can see
that there are clearly two spikes: one at 60 and the next one at 65, the first allowed and
the normal retirement age, respectively.
9 The other Schemes, including the self employed scheme, do not allow, in general, for early retirement.
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4.3 Variables
The dependent variable in the model is the length of time until retirement: i.e the
time that has elapsed since becoming eligible. The impact of the regulatory change
introduced from 2002 is analysed with the introduction of a dummy variable (r2002)
to capture its effects. In particular, we also use multiplicative dummy variables to
analyse the impact of the new rules on the response to social security incentives.
The explanatory variables that have been included in the specification (Xi ) can be
grouped in three main categories: social security regulation, labour characteristics,
personal and other variables. A detailed description of these variables can be found in
Appendix B. We estimate a Random Effects logit model so as to deal with unobserved
heterogeneity.
4.3.1 Social Security variables
We build up traditional measures of incentive mechanisms that are standard in this
literature. In particular, we use the Replacement Rate (RRt ), which is the ratio of the
expected pension benefits over wages, the Social Security Wealth (SSWt ), that is, the
present discounted value of the future stream of pension benefits, the Accrual Rate
(SSAt ) which measures the discounted change in SSW from postponing retirement
1 year and the Peak Value (PVt ), that compares this year’s social security wealth
to the maximum social security wealth that could be attained in the future. They are
constructed in real terms under the assumptions that: (i) death is certain beyond a given
age,10 while accounting for survival probabilities (ii) no changes in social security
regulation are expected by individuals, and (iii) it excludes any tax considerations.11
Table 2 provides summary statistics for the Social Security variables. It shows that,
on the one hand, the average stock of wealth was higher after the 2002 reform than
before; on the other, that the incentives linked to it were lower, while RR was higher,
implying that the monetary incentives to postpone retirement had decreased.
Both the level of social security wealth and the different incentive variables enter
the equation. The level captures wealth effects: the larger the value of wealth, the larger
the demand of all goods, including leisure, if leisure is a normal good. The incentive
variables capture the substitution effect: the higher the price for leisure, the lower its
demand, so that if there is a larger financial incentive to additional years of work, then
individuals will retire later.
4.3.2 Labour characteristics
Table 2 also contains information related to working status, distinguishing between
those observations corresponding to a person working (l) or being unemployed
with unemployment benefits (u) or not working at the time of the decision (nw).
10 Specifically we assume death is certain beyond 98.
11 When taxes are taken into consideration to compute the economic incentive variables, the results in
Table 2 are slightly stronger. Moreover, the overall conclusions drawn from the estimation results remain
similar.
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Table 2 Descriptive values of Social Security incentives and working status
All period considered 1996–2006 Before 2002 After 2002
Median Mean SD Median Mean SD Median Mean SD
SSWat 192.89 218.01 95.50 194.65 211.37 86.50 191.66 221.43 99.65
SSAat 7.77 7.83 12.12 11.00 10.86 11.53 5.87 6.26 12.12
PVat 30.82 39.39 40.45 40.36 47.22 40.56 25.66 35.36 39.79
RRbt 56.25 66.25 34.67 49.79 56.31 26.20 60.60 71.36 37.29
lbt−1 62.87 71.67 58.33
ubt−1 17.78 19.18 17.05
Otherbt−1 19.35 9.15 24.61
N 115,532 40,123 75,409
n 35,853 16,212 28,259
Sample of men born between 1936 and 1946, having worked in the General Regimen and with a relation
with the Social Security in 2006
N Number of observations, n people
SSW Social Security Wealth: present value of future stream of Social Security benefits that an individual
is entitled given her work history and her retirement age. SSA Social Security Accrual: discounted change
in SSW from postponing retirement by 1 year PV Peak Value: Difference between SSW today and the
maximum SSW from postponing it at some point in time in the future. RR Replacement rate: Is the ratio of
the expected pension benefits over wages received before retiring. lt−1 working at t−1; i ut−1unemployed
at t−1; Othert−1: neither unemployed nor working at t−1
(See Appendix B for a detailed explanation of the variables included in this table)
a In thousands of euros
b In percentage
(The remaining working status corresponds to already retired workers). The proportion
of unemployed has increased during the period considered while the ratio workers/non
workers has declined in the period after the reform.
Other control variables for labour characteristics is the industry where the individual
works, distinguishing between services sector and manufacturing, and some measures
of labour mobility or rotation. In particular, we have included two variables as proxies
for the degree of job turn-over: the number of different periods of contribution, (that
includes both labour and unemployment periods), and their average length in years.
4.3.3 Personal and other variables
We also control for age, education and health status and for other social benefits as they
may interact with the old age pension. The specification chosen also allows testing
whether the individual leaves his current situation during the first year he is entitled
to collect a pension benefit. Regional dummy variables and GDP growth are also
included to control for the macro environment.
The duration dependence of the hazard rate is captured in two ways. On the one
hand, following Bover et al. (2002), instead of imposing a specific functional form
for duration, we introduce additive dummy variables for each of the possible dis-
crete values of the duration variable. Durations of more than 6 years (which would
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necessarily imply that the person is at least 66) are treated as censored at 6, due to
the relatively small number of observations under such a circumstance. On the other
hand, interaction of certain independent variables with the duration are included to
test if the variable effects change with the number of years that a person takes to retire.
5 Results
The qualitative impacts of the variables on the hazard are discussed in terms of sign,
magnitude and statistical significance of the estimated coefficients, which are reported
in detail in Table 6 in Appendix B. Table 6 shows the results obtained under three
different specifications that contain two different sets of Social Security incentive
variables. So, under model A, we present the estimated coefficients obtained for the
basic specification, distinguishing between the Accrual Rate (SSA) and the Peak Value
(PV) as the incentive variable. Model B tries to capture the impact of the 2002 reform
through the inclusion of dummy variables that test for its relevance and its impact
on the response to the social security variables, while model C, also includes dummy
variables that capture the effect on the retirement hazard rate of having contributed to
the minimum or the maximum amount at each age.
The effect of the Social Security incentive variables on the probability of retiring
(and for all variables that are continuous) is measured as the effect of a 10 % change
in the variable on the predicted hazard. Table 7 for model A and Table 8 for models
B and C of Appendix B reflect the quantitative impact of a change in all the variables
included in the specification. In particular, these tables also record the impact of
qualitative variables, from its change from 0 to 1, so that the estimated coefficients
can be interpreted as the direct effect of having such characteristics on the probability
of retiring. A distinction of such effects by age is also reported for model A in Table
7 of Appendix B for illustrative purposes.
5.1 Economic incentives and regulation
The results in Table 6 show that all the coefficients of social security variables (SSW,
SSA and PV) are statistically significant with the expected sign, while a Wald test of
joint significance of the Social Security variables also supports such result. Increases
in the total present value of the flow of pensions that a person will receive from the
year she retires to the year she dies, i.e. a rise in SSW, increases the hazard. Increases
in the difference of this amount derived from postponing the retirement (either one or
more years) reduce the hazard, irrespectively of whether SSA or PV used to capture
the substitution effects. We include only SSA results since both are similar.
In spite of these effects being statistically significant, they are not very large.
As the figures for Model C in Table 3 show, on average, a 10 % rise in SSW
increases the probability of retiring between 60 and 65 years of age by around 4.6
percentage points. Moreover, these probabilities show a U-shaped form with age (Table
7), reaching the highest impact at 65, so that the closer a worker is to that age, the
more responsive to changes in SSW becomes.
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Table 3 % Quantitative effects of Social Security measures on the retirement probability
Age Predicted hazard %  in predicted hazard
10 %  SSW 10 % SSA 10 %  RR
Model C—Period: 2002–2006 (SSA)
60 0.14 5.89 −0.45 0.39
61 0.06 8.08 −0.49 0.53
62 0.08 7.88 −0.34 0.55
63 0.08 7.95 −0.21 0.60
64 0.19 5.97 −0.01 0.53
65 0.75 1.36 −0.12 0.15
Average 0.160 4.60 −0.13 0.36
Quantitative effects are reported as the % change in the predicted hazard. They are computed as the discrete
differences of the logistic function evaluated at a 10 % increase in the variables’ values with respect to
the logistic function evaluated at the observed variables’ values. The effects are estimated for the period
beginning in 2002. Results are obtained from the regressions presented in Table 6 corresponding to Model C.
Fig. 1 Predicted hazard rates before and after 2002 by age
As for the incentive variables, we find that increasing by 10 % the difference between
what a worker would receive if he retired now and what he would receive if he retired
1 year later (larger SSA) decreases the average probability of retiring between 60 and
65 by an amount ranging between 0.01 and between 0.49 pp if the 10 % increase takes
place in PV. The effects on the retirement probability of the SSA and PV incentives
are also U-shaped in relation to age (Table 7), so that they are larger at 60 and 65 and
lower for the intermediate ages in that age range.
On the other hand, the replacement rate shows the expected positive sign. However,
it is not statistically significant.
5.2 The effects of the 2002 reform
We observe that the predicted probability of retiring between 60 and 65 is higher
before 2002 than after 2002 and this relationship holds for every age in the range from
60 to 65 (Fig. 1).
As already mentioned, in order to test for the role of the 2002 reform on this
difference we have estimated our model with a dummy variable that takes value 1
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from 2002 onwards and the interaction of this dummy variable with the Social Security
incentives and pension wealth as regressors12. The evidence from the signs and t-ratios
of these variables (Table 6, models B and C) points out that the reform changed both
the pattern of response to the wealth variable, and also, in general the response to the
incentive variables. In particular, it reduced its impact on the timing of retirement. This
implies that we need a larger value of SSA (or PV) from 2002 onwards to reach the
same impact on the hazard. The effects are estimated for the period beginning in 2002.
Results are provided in Table 8. This result could be explained as a consequence of the
fact that one of the changes carried out under the reform improved the treatment for
those that had more than 30 years of contribution, increasing for them the amount of
the pension to be received at each age. The fact that most workers (64 %) already had
at least 30 contributory years (in particular, nearly one third had more than 34 years
of contribution), may explain the finding that the reform reduced the incidence of the
incentive structure. Additionally, the replacement rate becomes statistically significant
for this period, so that a more myopic approach seems to hold. Therefore, the observed
reduction in the hazard rate seems to stem from the new regulation, which has reduced
its incidence, the reduction in the incentive variables as reflected in Table 2 and also
from other factors that are captured by the dummy variable.
5.3 Contributive floors and ceilings
Our results show that those workers whose contribution was the regulatory minimum
(low topped) have a higher retirement probability at 60 than those who are not topped
(Table 8). It could be argued that the minimum contribution offsets the effect of early
retirement penalties so that it creates a strong incentive for low income earners to
retire, which is especially relevant at 60. From 61 onwards, being low topped reduces
the probability of retirement.
The results also show that high earners (those who have their contributions capped)
have a lower probability of retiring both at 64 and 65 (Table 8), in line with the findings
in Villagarcía (1995), Blanco (2000) and Labeaga (2008). This finding could result
from the fact that, for those workers, financial incentives are not a good proxy for the
marginal utility from working. A lower potential wage rate for a elderly workers is
likely to be associated with a lower probability of labour force participation as, other
things equal, a lower wage rate represents a lower opportunity cost of leisure and a
higher replacement rate for government pensions.
5.4 Duration variables
Given that individuals enter the sample as soon as they satisfy the requirements to claim
a pension, we can interpret the significance of the dummy coefficient for duration one
period (g1) as a test for the relevance of becoming entitled to retirement benefits13.
12 See Norton et al. (2004) for a discussion of such test.
13 See Appendix A for a description of these conditions.
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Fig. 2 Predicted hazard rates according to previous working status and age
The coefficient on g1 is statistically not significant (Table 6), so that becoming eligible
by itself is not a relevant ground for retirement. The results show also non-monotonic
duration dependence.
In the specification, we also include age dummies to account for differential effects
related to this variable. These dummies should capture the effect of growing older “per
se”, and not through the different coefficients in the calculation of pension rights that
are age dependent. The results show that, even when controlling for eligibility criteria
and Social security variables, 65 is a prevailing retirement age.
5.5 Working status
The labour market status prevailing during the year before the retirement decision
seems to be relevant for the retirement hazard. The results show that a person working
in a particular year has a lower probability of retiring the following year than a person
who was not working. They also show that being unemployed the preceding year
increases the probability of retiring. Such findings may only reflect the predominance
of special early retirement programs that exist for unemployed old people.14 We also
find that the size of these effects varies with age, as can be seen in Fig. 2, showing a
u-shaped form.
5.6 Individual characteristics and other
The other covariates that we have included in the estimation provide evidence mostly
in line with previous empirical findings.15 We obtain a negative impact of higher
education on the probability of retiring, in agreement with Villagarcía (1995) and
14 See García-Pérez and Sánchez-Martín (2008b) for an analysis of the transitions from unemployment
for older people.
15 Dummy variables for the region (Autonomous Community) where the worker initially registered are
included in the specifications, as a way to capture other differences in the economic environment. Coeffi-
cients are not reported but are available under request.
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Gutiérrez-Domènech (2006).16 Further, the effect of education is reinforced by dura-
tion, so that the probability of retiring of a higher educated worker becomes larger the
longer the time it has elapsed since becoming eligible.
The results show that job turnover (proxied by the total number of labour relations
that a person has had) has a negative impact on the retirement hazard, which fades
away as duration increases, a result in line with the findings that workers with a firm-
specific training history retire earlier than workers with a general training background
(see Montizaan et al. 2007). As for the average length of the contracts held, it plays
a significant role in the decision to retire only as time unfolds. Notice, however that,
although in general, the longer the contract, the more stable the individual’s working
life has been, our proxy is not a sophisticated measure of a stable career as the same
average may result from quite different job histories.
The finding that those receiving disability benefits the year before retirement show
a lower hazard, may reflect the fact that, besides having a poorer health, they will prob-
ably be the ones receiving retirement disability pensions when they turn 65, the only
age in which this type of pensions can be awarded, so that they will tend to wait until
that age. We also find that those receiving public transfers other than unemployment
or disability benefits have a lower retirement probability, which may be a consequence
of liquidity constraints.
Our results show that, during the period analyzed, the propensity to retire is pro-
cyclical, so that the hazard retirement rate is higher during expansions, in line with the
results in Montizaan et al. (2007) for the US, but at odds with the evidence for Spain
gathered in Muñoz (1995).
Finally, in contrast with other works where the sector of activity is found to be
playing a significant role (Conde-Ruiz and Galasso 2004; Blanco 2000; Villagarcía
1995; Muñoz 1995), we cannot find evidence of differences in retirement behaviour
between the service and the industrial sector.
Additionally, to check whether there is any bias resulting from the fact the estimation
includes individuals whose contributions are capped (and therefore not equal to their
wage), we perform an additional estimation exercise, where only those observations
that are not upper or lower capped are considered. According to our results the effect of
economic incentives goes in the same direction as when considering all observations.
Increases in the total present value of the flow of pensions that a person will receive
from the year she retires to the year she dies (increases in SSW) increases the hazard
while an increase in the difference of this amount from postponing retirement, SSA,
decreases the hazard. Thus, the results remain similar. Moreover, the effect of net
economic incentives is slightly stronger than when no tax information is considered,
but the overall conclusions drawn in the main text remain similar.
16 Muñoz (1995), on the other hand, finds evidence that the education has a quadratic effect, so that those
individuals with little or with a lot of studies retire later than those with an intermediate level of education.
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5.7 Comparative statics. Alternative regulatory schemes
Finally, we have performed a few counterfactual policy analysis exercises with
the aim of shedding light on how the estimated retirement probabilities respond
to small changes in the economic incentive mechanisms underlying the Span-
ish public pension system. The reason for considering only small changes of
the baseline rules is to minimize the Lucas’ critique, and also to check whether
these small changes would have enough sizeable effects on retirement or more
drastic changes would be needed. The analysis in this section should also be
interpreted as being only valid during a short period of time, within which
individuals would not change their expectations. Therefore, the results in this
section should only be considered as an exercise that provides a quantifica-
tion of what would have happened if alternative retirement reforms were pro-
posed, given the observed behavior of individuals after the pension reform in
2002.
Specifically, we have computed the pension wealth that a person would receive
under 3 alternative regulatory schemes implying very small changes over the retire-
ment rules established in the 2002 pension regulatory framework. Recall that
under this framework, at least 15 years of contribution were required. With only
these minimum contributory years, the pension would reach 50 % of the proxy
of gross average lifetime earnings (regulatory base), increasing up to 100 % when
35 years of contribution were reached. We have computed the SSW and the
incentive measures that result from the assumed alternative settings for each indi-
vidual in the sample to obtain counterfactual predicted retirement probabilities.
These are compared with the ones predicted from our estimates, which act as a
benchmark. The new probabilities are obtained using the specification in column
5 of Table 6. In particular, we compute the changes in relation to the popula-
tion that in the sample are subject to the rules prevailing in 2002. Each of the
three alternative regulatory schemes tries to change only one item in the pension
rules.
The first scenario (setting A) would consist of an overall reduction in the amount
of the pension received at all ages. It caps the pension at 96 % of the regulatory base,
not allowing individuals to get the 100 % of it at any retirement age. Under this sce-
nario, with 15 contributory years, the pension amount is only 48 % of the regulatory
base. With 35 or more years of contribution the pension would amount to 96 % of the
regulatory base.17
The second scenario (setting B) affects mostly the incentive structure as it requires
more years of contribution to claim a pension (18 years instead of 15), so that the
ladder becomes steeper. With 35 years of contributions, the worker receives 100 %
of the regulatory base. Moreover, at the age of 66, if the person has more than 35
contributory years, the pension is increased by 3 %.18 It must be taken into account
17 Up to 25 years of contribution, there would be a 3 pp increase for each additional contributory year, and
from 26, the increase would be 2 % per year up to 96 % at 35 or more years of contribution.
18 There is a 3 pp increase for each additional contributory year up to 25 years. Beyond 25, the increase
is 3.22 %.
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Table 4 Effects of alternative settings on retirement between ages 60 and 65
Benchmark Setting A Setting B Setting C
Predicted retirement probabilitya 80.706 80.144 79.743 80.537
Predicted retirement age 63.021 63.033 63.027 63.019
Change in number of retired peoplea –
By age −1.46 −1.64 −0.09
60 – −1.81 −1.72 0.00
61 – −2.42 −2.18 0.00
62 – −2.41 −2.17 0.00
63 – −2.50 −2.43 0.00
64 – −1.91 −1.99 0.00
65 – −0.52 −1.09 −0.24
The effects are estimated for the period beginning in 2002
Setting A: Capping the pension to 96 % of the Regulatory Base at 35 years of contribution and to 48 % at
15 years of contribution
Setting B: 18 years of contribution to claim a pension. Retiring after 65 implies 3 % increase
Setting C: Retiring after 65 implies 2 % increase and 3 % if 40 years of contribution
aIn percentage
that only 2.6 % of people at 60 have a labour history shorter than 18 years and longer
than 15 years, so that the impact on this end of the distribution would be rather small.
The third scenario (setting C) proposes changes in the short-term incentives to stay
beyond 65, introducing higher retirement benefits for each additional year beyond
that age. It reproduces part of the changes introduced by the “Acuerdo sobre Medidas
en Materia de Seguridad Social”, of 13 July 2006, which were implemented 2 years
later. In particular, at 66 with at least 35 years of contribution, a 2 % increase in
the pension is added, raising it to 3 % for those individuals with at least 40 years of
contribution.
Table 4 shows the computed counterfactual predicted retirement probabilities for
these three scenarios, the average predicted retirement age over the age interval 60-65
and the changes in the number of retirees in the same interval and its disaggregation
by ages. All the changes analysed result in an extremely small increase on the average
retirement age and a reduction in the number of people who retire between 60 and 65
which ranges from 0.09 % under setting C to 1.64 % under setting B.
Under the first two scenarios, retirement rates at all ages are affected by the proposed
changes and the effects are increasing with age up to 63, when the largest impact is
recorded. Retirement age is computed as a weighted average. Weights at each age
are computed using predicted probability of retirement under each alternative setting.
The smallest effect is at 65, probably reflecting that this age is regarded as normal
retirement age.
Under setting C, there is a very small impact on the probability of retiring between
60 and 64 which in fact is nil under the specification using SSA analised (last column
of Table 4). Since PV considers information about the entire time horizon, individuals
take into account earlier in their lives changes that will affect them after 65, in contrast
with what happens when predictions are derived from the specification with SSA, so
that the estimated effect (not shown) is larger. Despite these differences, predicted
retirement age is similar under both specifications.
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6 Conclusions
There is some agreement that generous early retirement provisions in the Social Secu-
rity System account for a large proportion of the drop in the labour force participation
of elderly workers that had been observed in Spain during the nineties. This paper aims
at quantifying the impact of these provisions and in particular, of the 2002 reform.
The evidence gathered shows that, in general, the economic incentives stemming
from Social Security regulations on old age pensions in Spain have the expected
effect on retirement. The present value of the future flow of pensions has a positive
impact on the probability of retiring, with larger pensions shortening the number of
years between becoming eligible for retirement and actually claiming the retirement
pension. Therefore, all measures taken to reduce the present value of such flow at
early ages may have the desired effect of reducing early retirement. Moreover, it
seems that the built-in incentives in the system to discourage early retirement have
a non negligible effect on old-age retirement, so that they are effective in retaining
people in the labour market. The higher flow of pensions that workers receive for
staying at work one additional year compensate for both the loss of leisure that they
experience for the additional year that they keep contributing and the wage they receive
at work. The quantitative size of such effect is statistically significant. Moreover, small
variations in the incentives measures have a sizeable effect on early retirement. For
the period beginning in 2002, a 10 % increase in SSW (SSA, PV, replacement) results
in a 4.6 %(−0.4 %,−0.2 % and 0.4 %) increase in the hazard according to estimates
in Model C (see Table 3). Therefore, from a policy perspective, regulatory changes
that could reinforce such effects are most welcome.
It has also been found that the new framework implemented since 2002 has reduced
the probability of retiring at each age, in spite of the fact that the built-in incentives
have reduced their incidence on retirement decisions, because of the decline in such
incentives, as shown in Table 5. Moreover, there is evidence pointing out to a higher
incidence of short term incentives such as the replacement rate on workers’ decisions.
The changes in the regulation that have taken place may explain such results. In
particular, the fact that one of the changes carried out under the reform improved the
treatment for those that had more than 30 years of contribution (64 % of the workers),
may explain the finding that the reform reduced the incidence of the incentive structure.
Any new change in the incentive structure of pensions should take into account
the fact that the new generations have longer work histories when becoming eligible
than former ones. The counterfactual results show that a small change in the incentive
structure has a small impact on the number of people retiring. It seems that to increase
the number of people staying beyond 65 requires more than a tiny push. It is therefore
necessary to combine economic incentives with other institutional constraints in order
to effectively increase the retirement age.
There is an urgent need to address the consequences of an ageing population on the
Social Security accounts. Minor changes in the rules that define the amount received
at each age in relation to the years effectively contributed may have a positive impact
on the pension accounts, through its impact on the probability to retire at each age.
Yet, as the evidence is this paper shows, this effect may be rather limited. Prospective
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amendments in retirement rules should be oriented to link the possibility of retiring
and the benefit rights not only to contribution efforts but also to life expectancy.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
which permits any use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and
the source are credited.
Appendix A: Legislation
A.1 The institutional framework and the changes in 2002
Social Security regulation during the period covered by the sample selected in this
paper experienced two main changes in relation to the framework established in 1985:
the reforms introduced in 1997 and in 2002.
Up to 1997 only 8 contributory years were required to be entitled to a retirement
pension. The change introduced in 1997 increased such minimum to 15, with the addi-
tional requirement that two of them had to have taken place during the last 15 years. Full
implementation was expected for 2002, with a progressive timetable set up to that year.
The normal retirement age in Spain, that is the age when a person becomes eligible
for the full pension benefit, is 65. Up to 2002, early retirement was possible from the
age of 60 only for those who had contributed to the labour mutual funds system (former
Social Security System) before January 1, 1967. An early retirement penalty defined
by a reduction coefficient, which is detailed below, was in place. The 2002 reform
extended early retirement to all workers, from the age of 61, if they complied with cer-
tain conditions that are detailed below. On the other hand, the reform also set incentives
to promote retirement beyond the age of 65. In particular, the 2002 reform established:
• Access to early retirement since the age of 61, if : a) the worker’s contributory years
were at least 30; b) the termination of his last employment had been involuntary and
c) he had spent at least 6 months as involuntarily unemployed and registered as job
seeker in the Public Employment Service Offices, during the period immediately
preceding the pension claim.
• Stronger linkages between the contributive effort exerted by workers and the pen-
sion received. Workers who wanted to retire between 64 and 61 years of age were
charged with a penalty that decreased with both age and total years of contribution.
• Premium to postponing retirement. Each full year of employment beyond statutory
retirement age (65), implied a 2 % increase in the regulatory base to compute
retirement benefits, only applicable to those workers with at least 35 years of
contributions.
• Retiring at the age of 64 was also possible without age penalty. Moreover, it did not
require a previous period of unemployment, but just the minimum 15 contributory
years. However, in this case, the firm had to hire another worker for a minimum
period of a year with a substitution contract to replace the retiring worker.
• It became possible to receive a partial pension from the age of 60 whilst continuing
to work part-time. Workers could partially retire if the firm replaced the retiree
with another worker (relief contract) to compensate for the retiree’s reduction in
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work-time. The amount of the pension was then conditioned by the reduction in
working hours (between 25 and 85 %).
The database does not provide information about contributions dating from before
the seventies, while all men born between 1936 and 1946 could potentially have
been working by 1967, as the youngest would have started working at the age of
21. Therefore, the assumption in the empirical part is that all people in the sample
contributed to the labour mutual funds system, so that they only need 15 years of
contribution to be entitled to retire. In fact, in the sample 34 % of those we observe
retiring, do so at 60 and 40 % do so with less than 30 registered years of contribution.
The last two points in the reform are not taken into account in the analysis as they
require information from the demand side, which we do not have.
A.2 The pension amount
The amount of the old age pension is defined by the interaction of different elements.
On the one hand, the Regulatory Base (Base reguladora, BR) that defines the amount
of the pension and it is directly related to the contribution bases received.19 The
minimum and maximum contributory periods to be considered in its calculation and
the inflation correction mechanism to obtain its present value are regulatory defined.
Moreover, there are minimum and maximum pensions that are yearly defined and its
amount depends on marital status and number of economically dependent people who
depend on the person receiving the benefit. A person retiring between 1985 and 1996
had a regulatory base defined as:














where wt−j are covered earnings for the jth month before retiring at t and It−j is the
price index for the jth month before retirement, and where only 8 years were taken
into account.
Since 2002, the regulatory base is defined taking into account the last 15 years:














A transitory period was set from 1997 to 2002 such that each year, one additional
year was included in the up-rated part of the weighted average and, therefore the
15 years were finally accounted for the definition of the regulatory base in 200220.
19 Different caps have been in place for different types of workers depending on their group of contribution
(grupo de cotización) associated with type of job and education level.
20 As social contributions are paid 14 months a year, the effective number of years taken into account to
compute the regulatory base was 6.8 up to 1997 and 12.9 since then.
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The relation between the first monthly pension received at time t (Bt ) and the regulatory
base (BRt ) calculated at t can be expressed as Bt = αTnt · B Rt where αTnt = αyntαant ,
so that αynt depends only on contributory years (n), and α
a
nt depends on the age of
retirement.






0, i f n < 15
0.6 + 0.02(n − 15), i f 15 ≤ n < 35
1, i f 35 ≤ n
The reform introduced in 1997 modified the number of years to define the contrib-






0, i f n < 15
0 · 5 + 0.03(n − 15), i f 15 ≤ n < 25
0 · 8 + 0.02(n − 25), i f 25 ≤ n < 35
1, i f 35 ≤ n
That new scheme thus implied a more progressive approach to full benefits. For
early retirement, regulation also sets a penalization system linked to age. Mutualistas
that retire early were subject to a reduction coefficient equivalent to 8 % for each year
in advance of 65 that he/she retires, so that αat = 1−0.08(65 − r) where r >= 60.
The 1997 reform reduced the reduction coefficient to 7 % for those with more than
40 contributory years, when claiming the pension. This coefficient should be jointly
applied with the one corresponding to contributory years.
The 2002 reform changed the penalization mechanism, so as to make the age coef-





0 i f r < 61
a + k(r − 60), i f 61 ≤ r < 65





a = 0.6; k = 0.08 i f n < 31
a = 0.625; k = 0.075 i f 31 ≤ n ≤ 34
a = 0.65; k = 0.07 i f 35 ≤ n ≤ 37
a = 0.675; k = 0.065 i f 38 ≤ n ≤ 39
a = 0.7; k = 0.06 i f n ≥ 40
where r is retirement age.
Moreover, the 2002 Amendment introduced a premium for late retirement, so that
the pension was increased by 2 % per additional year of work beyond 65, if the worker
had more than 35 years of contribution.
αTn = 1 + 0.02(r − 65) i f r > 65 and n ≥ 35
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Appendix B: Data
This appendix contains the definition of the variables included in the different specifi-
cations. As already mentioned in the text, the data source is the Continous Sample of
Working Histories (CSWH) 2006, “Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales” in Spanish.
The main descriptive statistics for each variable are presented in Table 5.
B.1 Economic incentive variables
To calculate the Social Security benefits to which individuals in the sample are entitled,
we make use of the Social Security covered earnings histories of individual in the
CSWH 2006.
SSWit : Value of Social Security Wealth of individual i at time t, at 2006 prices:
SSW (r)i t =
s=L∑
s=t
[Bi (s, r)[p(s|t)i/(1 + ρi )s−t ]],
indicates Social Security Wealth at time t (at age t) if retiring at age r; L is the maximum
life length,Bi (s, r)is the pension benefit in period s (at age s) if retiring at r, p(s| r) is
the conditional probability of an individual at time t to be alive at time s where s>r,
ρi is the individual discount rate.
To calculate the pension, we make use of data on covered earnings and from it we
build the Regulatory Base which is computed, following the regulation, as a moving
average of the contribution bases of the 15 years immediately before retirement. The
minimum base that has been used to complete job careers has been the one correspond-
ing to contributory group 5, senior administrative (“oficial administrativo”), the group
with the largest volume of population. On the other hand, the maximum base has been
taken to be the one corresponding to group 1, Engineers and Graduates (“Ingenieros
y Licenciados”), the group with the highest base for all the years. The maximum life
length (T) is assumed to be 98 years;ρi , the individual discount rate is assumed to be
fixed at 3 %, p(s| r), the conditional probability of an individual aged r to be alive at
age s, has been taken from the National Statistics Institute (INE) demographic pro-
jections (scenario 2), based upon 2001 Census data. Pensions and covered earnings
are assumed to increase 2 % yearly from 2006, while for previous years we use their
actual rate of change. Upper and lower limits on the pension benefits are applied to
compute retirment pension (the minimum one corresponds to a worker with a depen-
dent spouse). Not considering heterogeneity on survival probability among individuals
with different income levels, as well as on discount rates, could be understood as a
limitation on the assumptions behind the incentive variables used in the estimation.
However, heterogeneity in official estimates of life expectancy by socioeconomic level
are not available in Spain, and though it would be possible to estimate them, presum-
ably they would not differ too much, since the country is not characterized by such
remarkable levels of wealth inequality. Maybe additional research would be needed to
analyze the impact of considering different discount rates, also linked to income level.
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Table 5 Descriptive values
All period considered
1996–2006
Before 2002 After 2002
Median Mean SD Median Mean SD Median Mean SD
SSWat 199.30 222.50 96.83 195.83 211.84 87.02 201.35 228.17 101.21
SSAat 6.89 6.73 12.95 10.12 9.79 12.20 4.97 5.09 13.04
PVat 12.65 18.84 26.73 21.68 26.77 28.03 8.32 14.63 25.01
RRbt 57.61 67.36 35.50 50.77 57.61 26.56 61.93 72.55 38.45
lbt−1 57.49 62.67 54.74
ubt−1 24.28 27.54 22.55
numrel 10.770 25.866 9.547 19.763 11.420 28.565
meanlenghtc 7.237 7.243 7.763 7.436 6.957 7.122
time since eligiblec 2.677 1.565 2.275 1.390 2.892 1.609
univ 0.106 0.307 0.101 0.302 0.108 0.310
serv 0.364 0.481 0.356 0.479 0.367 0.482
disab 0.126 0.332 0.024 0.152 0.181 0.385
otherben 0.134 0.341 0.030 0.172 0.190 0.392
low60 0.086 0.281 0.101 0.302 0.078 0.268
low61 0.047 0.211 0.034 0.181 0.053 0.224
low62 0.029 0.168 0.015 0.123 0.036 0.187
low63 0.018 0.134 0.008 0.091 0.024 0.152
low64 0.011 0.104 0.005 0.067 0.014 0.120
low65 0.008 0.086 0.003 0.053 0.010 0.100
top64 0.001 0.037 0.001 0.025 0.002 0.042
top65 0.003 0.058 0.001 0.034 0.005 0.067
age61 0.219 0.413 0.236 0.425 0.209 0.407
age62 0.175 0.380 0.158 0.365 0.184 0.387
age63 0.135 0.342 0.110 0.313 0.148 0.355
age64 0.100 0.300 0.068 0.252 0.118 0.322
age65 0.065 0.246 0.027 0.162 0.085 0.278
cycled 3.667 0.679 4.262 0.688 3.350 0.406
r2002 0.653 0.476 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000
Sample of men born between 1936 and 1946, having worked in the General Scheme
a In thousands of euros
b In percentage
c In years
d Percentage variation of GDP
Assumed discount rates, and minimum and maximum pension, are homogeneous to
ensure simplicity in the analysis.
In order to calculate the different incentive measures, we need to project SSW for
the future. Two different situations arise, depending on the age of the individual and
whether or not he has retired. For those that are not 66 before 2006, we need to project
their pension and their SSW beyond this year. To do so, we assume that their salary
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and, therefore, their contributory base will be increasing at a 2 % rate every year. For
those that have retired before 2006, we project their salaries for the years before 2006
assuming that they keep the purchasing power of their last observed salary (or the
following one), so that the contributory base increases by the same amount as the
December over December CPI (t )
SSAit : The accrual rate,
SS A(r)i t = 1/(1 + ρi )SSW (r + 1)i t − SSW (r)i t
and we let
SSW (r + 1)i t = SSW (r + 1)i t+1
(1 + t )
A limitation of this index is that it does not take into account the comparison that
the individual can make between pension benefits and the level of his/her income. It
could be argued that the leisure preference is such that wages can fully compensate
for the forgone leisure enjoyment from postponing retirement.
PVit : Peak Value computed between the ages of 60 and 65 is defined as,
PVi (r) = max(SSW (r, r +1)i , SSW (r, r +2)ri , SSW (r, r +3)i , . . . , SSW (r, 66)i )
= SS Ai , otherwise
where
SSW (r, r + j) = SSW (r + j)/(1 + ρ) j − SSW (r)
We follow Coile and Gruber (2000) and restrict the peak value to be equal to the
accrual rate, if the individual works beyond the highest value for his social security
wealth.
RRi t : Replacement rate, R Ri (r) is the ratio of the expected pension benefitsBi (r) at
time t over wages wi (r) received at time t − 1 for individual i at age r , if the person
retires at age r .
R Ri (r) = Er (Bi (r)/wi (r)) where E is the expectation operator.
B.2. Other variables
disabit−1: Dummy variable that takes value 1 at age t if the person was receiving any
disability benefit while he was a year younger (at age t − 1) and zero, otherwise.
univi: Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the contributory group (“grupo de coti-
zación“) of the longest contributory relationship with the Social Security system is the
one with the highest academic qualifications (group 1: “Engineers and Graduates“),
and zero, otherwise.
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numreli: Number of contributory labour relations that have been recorded by the
Social Security before becoming entitled to an old age pension and that include those
involving the perception of unemployment benefits.
Regional Government (Comunidad Autónoma) where the worker initially regis-
tered: Group of 19 dummy variables, each one corresponding to a CA, plus one for
Ceuta and one for Melilla, that records the initial worker’s registration.
servi. Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the longest job a person has held has taken
place in the following CNAE sector classifications: Trade (50 to 52), Restoration
(Hostelería) (55), Transport (60 to 64), other services, including education y health
(65 to 67, 70 to 74, 80, 85 and 90)
uit−1. Dummy variable that takes value 1 at age t if the person was receiving unem-
ployment benefits, either as a subsidy or a contributory transfer, while he was a year
younger (at age t − 1), and zero, otherwise. (That is, people whose relationship with
Social Security is coded as a TRL 751-756 in the administrative files).
lit−1. Dummy variable that takes value 1 at age t if the person was working and
contributing to Social Security while he was a year younger (at age t − 1), and value
zero, otherwise.
g_kit : Dummy variables that take value 1 if the person is at age t in the k–th period
decision and value zero otherwise, where k=[1,6]. That is, g_k takes value 1 if the value
of the length of the spell from the year the person becomes entitled to a retirement
pension is k.
age_kit : Dummy variables that take value 1 if the person is k years old at time t and
zero otherwise, where k=[60,65].
cyclet : Spanish GDP real growth rate (for years 1997 to 2006)
r2002:Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the year of the observation is greater than
2001.
otherbenit−1: Dummy variable that takes value 1 at time t if the person was receiving
any Social Security benefit other than disability, old age or unemployment while he
was a year younger (at age t − 1) and zero, otherwise.
mlengthi:Average number of years for the spells that the individual i has had before
becoming entitled to a pension.
tr: a linear time trend
low60it : Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the person’s contribution was the
regulatory minimum at 60
low61it : Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the person’s contribution was the
regulatory minimum at 61
top64it : Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the person’s contribution was the regu-
latory maximum at 64
low65it : Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the person’s contribution was the
regulatory maximum at 65.
See Tables 5, 6, 7, 8.
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